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By now it is practically axiomatic that rumors about the death of the nation in an
age of postcolonialism and globalization are premature. Nowhere is this clearer
than in the case of Britain. The transfer of Hong Kong to China, the devolution of
Scotland, the moves toward abolishing hereditary peerage, and, on the very eve
of the new millennium, the shift of power from London to Belfast—if these, taken
either separately or together, do not signify the end of Britain as we have known
it in its post-Victorian incarnations, it is hard to imagine what would.1 To be sure,
sterling persists as the “national” currency into 2003, when most of the rest of
Europe has gone euro. There is still a monarchy and an established church. And
neither the most reckless nor the most utopian among us can afford to be sanguine
about the permanence of the recurrently “new” Irish situation or, for that matter,
its long-term viability. Indeed, the very fact that national identities are repeatedly
staged, ritualized performances designed to persuade subjects and citizens that the
nation is above and beyond the vagaries of history means that there have been
many incarnations of “Britain” over time and across space. And yet, the thor-
oughgoing, if not radical, disjuncture with the past that the events of the last few
* I take as my ironic point of departure the question posed by Gwyn Williams in the title of
his 1985 book, When Was Wales? (London, 1985). This essay went to press six months before
the war with Iraq led by Bush and Blair’s “coalition.” It was first given as the Modern European
Luncheon Talk at the American Historical Association meeting in San Francisco in January 2002.
An earlier version of it was presented at the “Pairing Empires” conference at Johns Hopkins
University, organized by Paul Kramer and John Plotz, in November 2000. It has benefited from
comments, criticisms, and all manner of useful references from Paul Arroyo, Jim Barrett, Cath-
erine Candy, Clare Crowston, Jed Esty, Doug Haynes, Madhavi Kale, Craig Koslofsky, Robert
Gregg, Philippa Levine, Ania Loomba, Laura Mayhall, Raka Nandi, Doug Peers, George Robb,
Mrinalini Sinha, and Adam Sutcliffe. I especially appreciate Dana Rabin’s enthusiastic support
for this project. Without the interest and insight of Tony Ballantyne, it would have been a very
different thing indeed. David H. Burton, Catherine Hall, P. J. Marshall, and Peter Stansky have
also helped to shape it, however variously and unwittingly, and I am indebted to each of them.
1 I am hardly the first to observe this. See Tom Nairn, After Britain: New Labour and the Return
of Scotland (London, 2000); and Peter Hitchens, The Abolition of Britain from Winston Churchill
to Princess Diana (London, 2000). As George F. Will observed with some regret, “bland Tony
Blair may have the most radical agenda in British history: the end of Britain”; see George F. Will,
“Cheshire Cat, Cheddar Man,” Newsweek (July 10, 2000), p. 72.
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years of the 1990s have produced has yet to be recognized, let alone fully coun-
tenanced.
At the same time, it is difficult to ignore the ways in which the persistence, the
endurance, and the longevity of Britain continue to be manufactured as evidence
of its ongoing relevance in world politics and its ability to survive a putatively
postnational future. Long after its demise in forms we have come to recognize in
the twentieth century, “Britain” has a curious and instructive afterlife—one whose
parameters and political stakes I want to sketch briefly here. In doing so I want to
consider how the United States has been and remains the audience perhaps ripest
for performances of Britain’s eternal Britishness. In the last three decades of the
twentieth century, Britain emerged as a poignant, almost pathetic figure in Amer-
ican culture, a safe and utopian place where very little distinction between past
and present could be discerned—a place untroubled, specifically, by the kind of
racial strife that has torn at the fabric of modern American society, not least by
intruding itself into twentieth-century American homes and the American psyche
via television news and, later, commercial programming. I want to suggest above
all that this persistent American image of Britain as a kind of Victorian and Ed-
wardian oasis was possible because in its commercialized forms, both high and
low, Britain has most often been stripped of its histories of blackness and imperial
culture “at home”—even while, paradoxically, empire “over there” was (and re-
mains) a central feature of Britain for export. Britain for export has in fact been a
whitewashed Britain, a commodified balm for a certain segment of the American
public seeking relief from racial tension and ugliness in the apparently racially
harmonious past (and present) of the mother country.
Clearly one of the most obvious public sites for the staging of Britain in America
has been at the high political level: first in the Reagan-Thatcher revival of the
special relationship, then in Clinton-Blair centrism, and, more ominously in recent
days, in the Blair-Bush alliance. Without diminishing the importance of this do-
main, I want to dwell here instead on the ways in which the performance of Britain
has also been visible in the American commercial appetite for British history, most
spectacularly in forms available on PBS, in Merchant Ivory films, or via the recent
spate of Jane Austen mania—a craze that crossed both big screens and small and
even made its way into regular network programming in the form of the weekly
TV show, Clueless.2 The extent to which this is an elite appetite in terms of class
and race is a question worthy of more sustained discussion than I have space for
here, especially if we wish to appreciate fully the tangled relationship between
production and consumption, between representation and politics, and between
politics and history in the modern “Atlantic world.”3 Regardless, the American
2 See Devoney Looser, “Feminist Implications of the Silver Screen Austen,” in Jane Austen in
Hollywood, ed. Linda Troost and Sayre Greenfield (Louisville, Ky., 1998), pp. 159–76.
3 Douglas Haynes, “White Lies: The British Past in Postwar America,” History Teacher 31,
no. 1 (November 1997): 96–100, and his essay, “The Whiteness of Civilization: The Transatlantic
Crisis of White Supremacy and British Television Programming in the United States in the 1970s,”
in After the Imperial Turn: Thinking with and through the Nation, Post Colonialism, ed. Antoinette
Burton (Durham, N.C., 2003). Allison Graham takes up many of these questions in her book
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media, in its various private and public incarnations, has certainly done its part to
keep Britain before the eyes of the American public. This is in some respects a
legacy of the post–World War II period, though the monarchy and its accoutre-
ments—routinely compressed as the sum total of Britishness—has been a source
of interest, envy, and cultural critique for Americans since well before that, as Fred
Leventhal’s recent work has demonstrated.4 Admiration for British pageantry, ex-
ceptionalism, and empire continues to be a theme of both network and cable news
coverage, as the highly ceremonial passing of power in Hong Kong from Britain
to China, the attention to fifty years of Indian independence, and the rhetoric
around the Millennium Dome on New Year’s eve and day each testify. The re-
lentless and prurient coverage of Lady Diana’s life and death, and especially her
funeral, paraded traditional Englishness before the American public at the very
moment when Britons were trying (also with the help of the media) to understand
whether such traditions still had purchase, why, and for whom.5 The relative in-
difference with which many Britons in Britain viewed the televised ceremonies
surrounding the death of the Queen Mother in April 2002 stands in stark contrast
to the coverage of her passing on both cable and network television in the United
States, where (incredibly) one CNN commentator actually claimed it was a story
that was “emerging simultaneously” with accounts of escalating violence in the
Middle East.6
Despite these contemporary images—and of course, because of them—for
many Americans Britain on TV looks consistently like history: like the past at
work in the present.7 Needless to say, there is plenty of American agency, even
Yankee entrepreneurship, in this: Simon Schama’s recent multipart series on British
history, as well as the airing of the program Victoria and Albert in the fall of 2002,
are only the most recent examples of what local PBS stations actively seek out
and buy from British production companies. If Raphael Samuel and others have
been right in thinking that the rise of the heritage industry means that all nations
are destined to become theme parks, Americans get to see Britain as-it-was-and-
Framing the South: Hollywood, Television, and Race during the Civil Rights Struggle (Baltimore,
2001).
4 The literature on this is vast. Most recently, see H. Mark Glancy, When Britain Loved Hol-
lywood: The Hollywood “British” Film, 1939–1945 (Manchester, 1999); and Fred Leventhal,
“Essential Democracy: The 1939 Visit to the United States,” in Singular Continuities: Tradition,
Nostalgia, and Identity in Modern British Culture, ed. George K. Behlmer and Fred M. Leventhal
(Stanford, Calif., 2000), pp. 163–77.
5 See Adrian Kear and Deborah Lynn Steinberg, eds., Mourning Diana: Nation, Culture and
the Performance of Grief (London, 1999).
6 Warren Hodge, “For the Queen Mother, Solemn Drums (and Offstage Disputes),” New York
Times (April 6, 2002), p. A4. Despite its critical coverage, the New York Times continued to
feature the Queen Mother’s death, lying in state, and funeral as front-page news (with color photos)
on and off in the first two weeks of April 2002.
7 If Peter Mandler is right, and the very elite class that American public television stages as
equivalent to “Britain” was in fact “uninterested in its own national past,” this is not simply
ironic—it speaks to the real use-value Britain provides for legitimating Americans’ view of them-
selves as the future, especially given the corporate sponsorship of PBS. See Peter Mandler,
“Against ‘Englishness’: English Culture and the Limits to Rural Nostalgia, 1850–1940,” Trans-
actions of the Royal Historical Society 7, ser. 6 (1997): 158 ff.
362 Burton
is/as-it-is-and-was without ever having to go there—giving armchair imperialism
a whole new meaning.8 But we must not leave it at that, for the versions of British
history most Americans get access to have a critically important, if complex, re-
lationship to empire. British imperialism is never erased completely from sight;
how could it be if we believe the claim of Edward Said and others that empire
made its way into the very interstices of eighteenth-, nineteenth-, and twentieth-
century British life? Here the subtle ways in which people of color and imperial
commodities and trinkets make their way into the filmscapes of Austen movies
make for interesting ethnographic opportunities, as well as for an uncanny reprise
of Said’s reading of Austen as classic text for the (re)discovery of empire at home.9
In British-made programs—produced increasingly since the 1970s for export to
the United States—empire is typically represented as a kind of agonistic moral
dilemma (as in the critically acclaimed Jewel in the Crown); or as the quaint and
exceptional ravings of a one-off egomaniac (as in the miniseries Cecil Rhodes);
or, most recently, as the implied consequence of postwar immigration, which
brought colonial people to Britain and left them with painful moral dilemmas about
how to be Black Britons or how to accommodate their blackness to British life
and mores in the present (as in the multipart crime drama Prime Suspect).10
Such staging by now has a long television history, as Douglas Haynes’s recent
research on the relationship between discourses of white supremacy and British
TV programming in the United States in the 1970s powerfully suggests.11 Signifi-
cantly, it is crime dramas and not historical programming per se that has brought
race as a recognizably “domestic” British social issue into largely white, middle-
class American living rooms in the 1980s and 1990s.12 As such it is a subject only
dimly linked to empire, and, tellingly in the case of the Jane Tennison character
of the Prime Suspect series, it is commonly connected (if not subordinated) to the
story of a white woman’s quest for professional recognition in the present day. In
this way, empire and race are neatly and consistently segregated from each other
at the same time that they are being refracted through the biography of a white
woman. This maneuver is a continuation of narratives of Britain, empire, and home
that originated with Victorian antislavery campaigns and have cast a long shadow
on British fiction from Jane Eyre to Virginia Woolf and beyond. Coded as a social
issue equivalent to women’s emancipation, Britain’s racial “problem” appears to
have little or no relationship to Britain’s “real” history (whether of monarchy or
empire). How many Americans, one wonders, have even heard of Stephen Law-
rence—the black British youth beaten by a local white gang—let alone are aware
8 See Raphael Samuel’s three-volume collection Patriotism (London, 1989), his Theatres of
Memory (London, 1994), and Island Stories (London, 1995); Bill Readings, The University in
Ruins (Cambridge, Mass., 1996); and Patrick Wright, On Living in an Old Country: The National
Past in Contemporary Britain (London, 1985).
9 See Claudia L. Johnson, “Run Mad, But Do Not Faint,” review of Patricia Rozema’s film,
Mansfield Park, Times Literary Supplement (December 31, 1999).
10 Though no one has written a comprehensive account of these 1990s programs in the United
States, Jeffrey S. Miller’s history of earlier programming is instructive: Something Completely
Different: British Television and American Culture (Minneapolis, 2000).
11 Haynes, “The Whiteness of Civilization.”
12 I am grateful to Jim Barrett for this observation.
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of how his violent death in 1993 has been linked in public discourse to both
legacies of the Empire Windrush (post-1945 immigration) or to long-standing
questions of race relations in Britain?13
The PBS broadcast of “The Murder of Stephen Lawrence” in January 2002
arguably helped to redress this invisibility, though the conditions of its presentation
tell us much about how the American media translates “blackness” in Britain to
its viewers at the beginning of the new millennium. Screened on Martin Luther
King day, the program was introduced by Russell Baker as “highly unusual for
Masterpiece Theater”—not because it dealt with racism in contemporary Britain
but because of the mix of genres (handheld camera/documentary technique com-
bined with semifactual narrative) that the film featured. This astonishing declara-
tion was followed by Baker’s observation that “The Murder of Stephen Lawrence”
allowed Americans to see racism in Britain today the way it had been in the United
States during the Civil Rights era.14 With two brief strokes Baker effectively white-
washed Masterpiece Theater’s own historical preoccupation with upper-class En-
gland and reinscribed Britain as history in the present in a new and highly imag-
inative narrative—in addition, of course, to occluding empire yet again in the story
of what was Britain. His introduction not only obscured connections between im-
perial history and the present; it also cast American racial problems as a thing of
the past and Britain itself as a belated, if not a derivative, terrain of racial strife.15
Moreover, the show was followed by a rerun of Upstairs Downstairs, and the
publicity for the program was accompanied by advertisements for the next Mas-
terpiece Theater production of Othello (staged in contemporary Britain in a met-
ropolitan setting).16 Thus were Shakespeare and Edwardian Britain evoked as evi-
dence of Masterpiece Theater’s traditional commitments as well as its adaptability
in the face of an ever-evolving, ever-modernizing transatlantic taste for Anglo-
philia.17
13 Onyekachi Wambu, ed., Empire Windrush: Fifty Years of Writing about Black Britain (Lon-
don, 1998); Yasmin Alibhai-Brown, Imagining New Britain (London, 2001); “Black Teenager
Dies after Knife Attack by White Youths: Police Fear Racist Backlash,” London Times (April 24,
1993); “Race Case Police Fail to Provide Crucial Answers,” London Times (July 18, 1998); “Race
in the Classroom: The Right Way to Advance Tolerance after Lawrence,” London Times (February
26, 1999); Kamlesh Bahl, “Lessons of Lawrence: An Open Letter to the Prime Minister,” London
Times (March 2, 1999); Brian Cathcart, The Case of Stephen Lawrence (New York, 1999); Sir
William Macpherson, The Stephen Lawrence Inquiry Report: www.archive.official-docu-
ments.co.uk/document/cm42/4262.
14 Russell Baker, introducing Masterpiece Theater’s “The Murder of Stephen Lawrence,” Jan-
uary 21, 2002, on WILL (Champaign-Urbana, Ill.). The program also aired that night in PBS
stations in New York, Philadelphia, and California.
15 The U.S. media coverage of Cathy Freeman in the 1998 Olympics paralleled this in fasci-
nating ways. Freeman, an aboriginal athlete representing Australia at the games, was routinely
compared to the Jackie Robinson of the 1940s and 1950s in terms of both her achievement and
its significance. Commentators thereby produced a regressive, racialized timeline similar to
Baker’s Lawrence/Civil Rights narrative and, of course, cast Freeman’s “blackness” as unprob-
lematically equivalent to Robinson’s African-Americanness (“Negro-ness,” in the parlance of his
times). Thanks to Tony Ballantyne for making this connection.
16 http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/masterpiece/lawrence/index.html. Among other things, the site of-
fers bibliographical links to sources related to the Lawrence murder.
17 In fact, Upstairs Downstairs was the focus of much early criticism of PBS among those who
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Perhaps this savvy packaging signals a departure for PBS with respect to its
approach to British programming in America in the twenty-first century. In her
review of “The Murder of Stephen Lawrence” for the New York Times, Caryn
James hoped as much. At the same time, she reviewed the film and the Othello
production in the same article and reminded readers that Othello was played by
Eamon Damon, who had also played a character on HBO’s popular prison series,
Oz—a contextualizing gesture that suggests that critics may continue to refract
British television exports through a very particular kind of cultural lens, one that
capitalizes on the drama racial struggles (and black actors) provide without at-
tending to the political power that representations of “black Britain” at once reflect,
produce, and contest.18 Most if not all PBS watchers are still, I would argue, more
likely to be aware of the effects of Salman Rushdie’s fatwa on debates about
multiculturalism in Britain than they are about the ongoing, daily impact of post-
imperial history on British society today.19 Chances are they understand those de-
bates as “religious” or “fundamentalist” issues rather than as cultural and political
manifestations of the demographic effects of postcolonial migration, labor condi-
tions, and race relations in present-day Britain. This is a narrow, ahistorical reading
that the events of September 11, 2001, and after seem, unfortunately, only to
confirm, at least as they are covered in the American media. It is also a reading
that obscures the fact that British Muslims are largely Indian and Pakistani either
by origin or descent and therefore represent, among other things, the after effects
of imperial rule in the contemporary metropole.20 The image of the horseguard
with a small tear in his eye that graced the cover of the New Yorker in September
of 1997, in the second of two issues in as many months devoted to commemorating
fifty years of the end of empire, speaks as eloquently to the kind of American
nostalgia for what Britain was as any PBS program—playing as it does on that
classic London tourist experience, the changing of the guard.21
American nostalgia for Britain as an essentially white island of history is not,
therefore, necessarily interrupted or challenged by the popularity of Raj fictions
(where race happens “over there”); the occasional “real life” crime episode where
black Britons are involved (either as policemen, suspects, or victims); or even
actual events having to do with race, ethnicity, and postcolonialism in Britain, as
the minimal coverage of the Bradford and Oldham race riots in the U.S. news in
the summer of 2001 testifies. Events in Ireland—which have historically had to
do precisely with questions of race, ethnicity, and emergent postcolonialism—are
an intriguing exception to which I can only allude here. Not unlike the Rushdie
affair, they are typically understood in confessional terms rather than as indices of
believed that reliance on such “foreign” programming was “un-American.” See David Stewart,
The PBS Companion: A History of Public Television (New York, 1999), pp. 71–82; and Timothy
Brennan, “Masterpiece Theatre and the Uses of Tradition,” Social Text 12 (1985): 102–12.
18 Caryn James, “Crime and Race in England, Both Factual and Fictitious,” New York Times
(January 21, 2002).
19 See Talal Asad, Genealogies of Religion: Discipline and Reasons of Power in Christianity
and Islam (Baltimore, 1993).
20 I am grateful to Tony Ballantyne for pressing this point.
21 New Yorker (September 15, 1997).
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conditions of postcoloniality as well. What I want to explore for now is the ways
in which nostalgia for Britain (Britain primarily as “England,” it should be said)
represents one expression of the contemporary desire for what America has not
been in the twentieth century: that is, ordered, white, untouched by social upheaval,
homogeneous, and polite, if not quaintly anachronistic.22 And to appreciate this
fully we must consider how and why the practice of British history in the United
States has not only traditionally fulfilled this desire but also continues to do so by
incorporating the challenges that postcolonial theory and history have to offer in
a neatly repackaged form of British studies, thereby attempting at once to neutralize
the impact that the so-called new imperial studies has had on the “island story”
and to turn the imperial turn into a market advantage for upcoming professional
historians (the next generation of purveyors of British history). In this sense, I want
to suggest that, rather than an endangered species, British history both “high”
(academic) and “low” (in its public culture varieties) is destined to survive well
into the twenty-first century as a remarkably resilient cultural commodity.
I take as my historical evidence the 1999 report published by the North Amer-
ican Conference of British Studies (NACBS)—sometimes referred to as the Stan-
sky Report since Peter Stansky, professor of history at Stanford University, was
the presiding author.23 The report was designed to assess the state of the field,
evaluate the role of British history and British studies in the academy, and espe-
cially to examine the future prospects for students working primarily in history
graduate programs. Compiled by committee, the report is, by its own admission,
a response “to the widespread perception among the members of the profession
that British Studies does not occupy the same position of importance within the
academy [as it did].” Indeed, the authors of the report argue that “there is general
agreement that British history no longer holds its traditional claim to attention in
the American academy.” Though they do not detail why this should be so, the
implication is that the appreciation of things English in general has declined over
the past few decades: “In future, rather than relying on a strong anglophilia among
students and their families, the study of Britain must stand or fall on its broader
significances for the history and present situation of humanity.”24 The question of
how the democratization of undergraduate admissions has affected college and
university life is completely side-stepped—thereby obscuring the ways in which
22 Because of its connection to television watching (the small screen), this American love of
British history may be connected to what Lauren Berlant calls the “downsizing” and “privatization
of U.S. citizenship,” together with the desire for an American citizen (like the fetus and the child)
“not yet bruised by history.” See her The Queen of America Goes to Washington City: Essays on
Sex and Citizenship (Durham, N.C., 1997), pp. 3, 6. That such nostalgia for empire can exist side
by side with nostalgia for a “British” nation shorn of its domestic imperial legacies should be no
surprise, given (1) the historically concentric relationship between nation and empire; (2) the
generally accepted view that empire represented the best Britain had to offer to the world; and
(3) the disaggregation of empire from racial questions in popular American culture described
above.
23 Peter Stansky et al., NACBS Report on the State and Future of British Studies in North
America (November 1999); available on-line at http://www.nacbs.org/report.html. Thanks to Peter
Hansen for this website reference.
24 Ibid., p. 15.
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the whiteness of the American university student body has been challenged since
at least the 1960s. The authors of the report explain that British history courses
“ought not, of course, be considered or planned solely on the basis of undergrad-
uate appeal.” But the authors of the report are not uninterested in addressing the
question of audiences, which they believe are winnable by other means (“market
trends are not our nemesis, but our opportunity”).25
Chief among the report’s preoccupations is an insistence on the fact that “the
history of Britain is arguably the most important ‘national’ history precisely be-
cause it has been the most intertwined with, and influential upon, other histories
worldwide, in all their dimensions—political, economic, social and cultural.”26
This linkage between British history and world history is then laid out in some
detail, with sections devoted to (1) the interaction of the English state with its
“nearest neighbors” (Scotland, Wales, Ireland); (2) Britain’s relationship to “a great
many countries and regions . . . most obviously South Asia, but also the Caribbean,
Africa and even Latin America”; (3) “the huge diaspora of peoples from the British
Isles,” which has, it is claimed, “done much to[ward] making English the closest
thing to a world language”; (4) “the Empire itself,” which not only encompasses
“the military and political ‘expansion of England’ and its ways” but is also “a story
of complex relationships between the colonizing and the colonized, and of two-
way flows of influence”; (5) “‘globalization’ in all its many dimensions—political,
economic, social and cultural”; (6) other (mostly European) states and the process
of state formation; (7) collaboration with English departments (where “the emer-
gence of English as the second language of the world, where it is not already the
first, only adds to the indispensability of British history”); and (8) the study of law
and science.27 Despite the fact that even contemporary Britons who are resistant
to the Europeanization of Britain recognize the need to think of themselves “not
as her Majesty’s loyal subjects but as citizens of Europe,” the economic realities
of continental dependence and interrelationship are scarcely of concern in the
report at all—raising questions about the scope of the global and the particular
politics of American perspectives on the future past of Britain as well.28
At one level, the diagnoses and the prognoses offered by the NACBS report are
not surprising. They are even admirable evidence of a principled awareness of the
shifting place of Britain in the world and the academy, and of the willingness of
the body that is responsible for British history in North America to seize the mo-
ment and reimagine what a new, postmillennial British studies might look like.
Like all useful historical evidence, the NACBS Report both reflects the historical
moment in which it was written and produces a number of political and ideological
claims worthy of further scrutiny if we are to appreciate more fully how nostalgia
for Britain has worked, and continues to work, in the American context. Despite
its recurrent emphasis on market opportunity, the report registers a profound am-
25 Ibid.
26 Ibid.
27 Ibid., pp. 15–19.
28 Max Beloff, “Empire Reconsidered,” Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History 27,
no. 2 (May 1999): 15.
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bivalence about the role of the new imperial studies in creating a climate where a
new and improved British history is not just desirable but apparently politically
necessary and economically profitable as well. The authors of the report repeatedly
reassure their readers that their text is not a prescription for a “postcolonial” British
history. My sense is that they take up this position because they genuinely do not
wish to be seen endorsing one method over another and because they understand
(or misunderstand) postcolonialism as an “attack” on the nation. According to the
report, “no group has been more vocal in its condemnation of British Studies than
those historians whose work focuses on the impact of imperialism on colonial
subjects and who have had the most contact with colleagues in non-Western areas.”
And furthermore, “New work in post-colonial theory, gender and empire, imperial
legislation and indigenous resistance movements has helped formulate an attack
on British studies from within and has been adopted—albeit in a caricatured
form—by those wishing to argue against British replacement hires on political
grounds. These demoralizing trends, along with the recent deaths of luminaries
such as Edward Thompson, Raphael Samuel and Lawrence Stone, have cast a pall
over British historians who have been more inclined to accept these criticisms and
lament the end of an era than to mount a spirited defense of British Studies.”29 The
conflation of critiques of national history with attacks on the future of British
studies is telling, especially since many interlocutors of the nation do not imagine
that it is really in danger of disappearing, even and especially under the aegis of
late twentieth-century global capitalism.30 The report’s determination to link the
narrative of attack with the death of British history’s past “luminaries” is equally
instructive, given the way in which Thompson became embroiled in debates about
empire at the end of his life and the critiques of British history as usual that Raphael
Samuel was engaged in—a project he called “unravelling Britain”—since at least
the 1980s.31
Clearly the positions articulated by the report are motivated in large measure
by a concern for the waning appeal of British history as a subject in the American
academy as well as by its concomitant structural vulnerability in institutions of
American higher education. These are not concerns to be dismissed lightly, if at
all. What is significant, however, is the way British history is recast in the report:
the way it is turned from unwitting casualty into a redemptive pedagogical and
institutional, if not also a political, force. The right and proper place of empire in
British history bears heavily on this redemptive possibility. Studies of the British
empire in their most recent forms are represented in the report as a kind of cor-
ruption of “internal” national history, rather than as projects that reveal the impact
29 Stansky et al., p. 10.
30 See David Held and Anthony McGrew, “The Great Globalization Debate,” in The Global
Transformations Reader, ed. David Held and Andrew McGrew (London, 2000), pp. 1–45.
31 E. P. Thompson, Alien Homage: Edward Thompson and Rabindranath Tagore (Oxford,
1993); see Robert Gregg and Madhavi Kale, “The Empire and Mr. Thompson: The Making of
Indian Princes and the English Working Class,” Economic and Political Weekly 32 (1997): 2273–
88; and Robert Gregg, “Class Culture and Empire: E. P. Thompson and the Making of Social
History,” Journal of Historical Sociology 11, no. 4 (1998): 419–60; and Samuel (n. 8 above),
Island Stories.
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of empire on domestic relationships, economies, or imaginations. Imperial histories
also emerge as the only politically motivated versions of British history on offer,
as opposed to the “internal” version which is apparently outside political consid-
erations and immune, both in its origins and in its contemporary practices, from
the impact of contemporary (let alone past) politics and history.32 Even more strik-
ing is the way the “national” history of Britain is reinvented so that it becomes the
best, most auspicious ground for doing imperial, world, global, and transnational
histories. As the report notes, “British history is perhaps the best single avenue of
inquiry into the large processes of ‘globalization’ in all its many dimensions—
political, economic, social and cultural. As creators of the first true ‘world system’
and the first world market, and as the originators of industrialism, the British
occupy a unique position in human history.”33 Again, these discussions are always
connected to structural changes in the political economy of departments and uni-
versities, ever with an eye to the practical advantage that British history can bring.
If this is the echo of a certain paradigm of “British” pragmatism—one that has
historically pitted itself against the theoretical pretensions of the French—it also
arguably approaches what might be called the stereotypically American quest for
commodification and marketability, especially where that quest has historically
invoked “human history” and universal values to ratify its self-interest.
The Americanization of British history that the NACBS report offers circles
invariably back through the nostalgia for (a certain version of) the “British” nation,
which, as I have suggested, is characteristic of the late twentieth-century American
commercial appetite for things British more generally. That is to say, the report
offers the possibility of a British history whose imperial past is the crucial, if also
muted, foundation for the participation of British historians in shaping accounts
of new global order as manufactured in the future American college classroom:
Many of us believe that we must overcome the insularity that has too often afflicted
British history. To remain viable, we need to demonstrate that the history of Britain is
not merely an “island story,” but indeed a world story. This group is not advocating
imperial history per se: it, too, is susceptible to insularity in some of its preoccupations
and practices. It is referring instead to an appreciation of British history as an avenue
of inquiry into the larger processes that have transformed the globe and the relations
among its inhabitants. Though the term globalization strikes some as too triumphalist
and trite to carry serious analytical weight, it does at least allude to the importance
of an historical transformation that transcends national boundaries, a world-incor-
porating phenomenon that is at once political and social, economic and cultural, tech-
nological and intellectual. Historians of Britain—or more particularly of Britain in
relation to the rest of the world—are as well prepared as anyone to understand the
course and character of this global process.34 [Emphasis mine]
32 This language of inside/out replicates a long history of dichotomous thinking linked by
Rushdie and others to imperialism. See Robert Gregg, Inside Out/Outside In: Essays in Compar-
ative History (New York, 1999).
33 Stansky et al. (n. 23 above), p. 17.
34 Ibid., p. 31.
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Here the “British” story becomes a world story, if not a stage for the world story—
or, possibly, the lens through which other world stories are glimpsed. This might
well be interpreted as a call for the British national story—which is, ineluctably,
an imperial story—to be used as the basis for the kind of global or transnational
history that looks out from the center to the periphery, taking in the latter without
doing much to question the centrality of the former. This is especially true because
the authors of the report do not expressly call for young British historians to be
trained in anything other than the island story; at one point the report even suggests
that “specialist” lecturers be “brought” into surveys and other courses to deal with
other material or regions that arise in this new British-based world history model.
Many will recognize in this suggestion the 1960s and 1970s “area studies” ap-
proach in a new historical form, one that places disciplines like English or pro-
grams like South Asia studies in a subordinate position reminiscent of the status
of “native informants” who made much of what counts as “colonial knowledge”
possible in the first place.
The report concedes that “much of the most interesting scholarship in recent
years has pursued lines of inquiry that . . . interrogate traditional conceptions of
Britain and Britishness, rethinking the boundaries that have been drawn around
these subjects.” But the desire for a recentering of a nationalist agenda is difficult
to ignore, even in its politically corrected, updated form, as when the authors
remind us of the importance of the British diaspora. This, the authors claim, “has
done much to[ward] making English the closest thing to a world language. This
effect on world history is vast and largely unexplored, though its origins go back
centuries in British history. A history of the English-speaking peoples, their sim-
ilarities and differences, and their collective role in world history, would make a
stimulating, and attractive, course (without having to carry Churchillian baggage).”
Less obviously, but equally powerfully, the report’s attempt to domesticate some
of the new empire work is in danger of echoing an imperial attitude with regard
to colonial peoples and encounters that reveals the neocolonial perils of such in-
corporationist gestures. To wit: “We have seen efforts to push the parameters of
British history to the limits of its influence, incorporating the experiences of those
peoples—Africans, Asians, and others—whose collision with this expansionist
state transformed their societies and mentalities.” The transformation of Britain
itself by these “collisions” scarcely registers, though there is some recognition
elsewhere in the report of the ways in which new scholarship has challenged the
boundaries of Britain itself.
The fact that the report was written collectively may account for such contra-
dictions and ambivalences in the text. Such unevenness is also evidence, I think,
of the combination of paranoia and competition the authors convey in their quest
to portray British history as an endangered species that, at the same time, promises
to be a model for the salvation of national history, albeit only of the exceptional
kind like Britain’s. For example:
British history increasingly must vie with African history and Latin American history
and Chinese history and various other nationally or regionally-defined histories, not to
mention thematically and ethnically-defined specialties such as women’s history and
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Jewish history and military history. Whatever prospects exist for British history in this
environment are less likely to be realized if its advocates insist on Britain’s traditional
place of privilege in the discipline than if they demonstrate that it remains a vital field
of study that offers insights and connections that benefit students and colleagues in
other areas. A British history that stresses its encounter with and significance to the
rest of the world may be far better prepared to do this than one that accentuates its
insularity.
As Bill Readings has so persuasively argued in his 1996 book, The University in
Ruins, the language in which discussions about globalism and globalization are
conducted is not that of culture but that of economic management.35 This is a
phenomenon that can be seen more starkly in the NACBS report than perhaps in
the habits of American television-viewing audiences, unless we understand BBC
productions and “British history” as it is taught in North America as “events which
make audiences happen”—audiences that are curious about, and possibly seduced
by, the romance of what was Britain. The fact that Masterpiece Theater has long
been funded by Mobil suggests important and heretofore unremarked connections
between the corporate investments of public television and those of American
universities. Some might argue that British history as it has been taught in this
country can be read as a kind of competitive response to the likes of Masterpiece
Theater and its Russell Bakers: not as a way of interrogating Britain as history,
but as a way of putting a brake on the runaway American triumphalism (we are
the future, you are the past) embedded in that publicly accessible and highly pop-
ular narrative. The fact that neither the NACBS nor the Masterpiece Theater set
appears to see or to care about the most statistically numerous constituency subject
to commercial and artistic influences emanating from and through Great Britain—
teenagers buying and listening to the kinds of music Paul Gilroy argues is the basis
for a contemporary “black atlantic”—reminds us of the ultimately limited reach
of traditional British history (regardless of who its purveyors are), as well as of
the equally limited purchase of the unproblematically “white nation” in an era of
accelerated transnational commerce and racialized commodification.36
The most resistant, and perhaps most generous, reading of the NACBS report
is that it argues for British history as a local history, competing with other local
histories in an age of globalization but with a historically new competitive disad-
vantage because of the material realities of late twentieth-century capitalisms and
their cultures—and that in doing so it reproduces, both consciously and uncon-
sciously, some of the values and presumptions of British imperialism itself. Such
a reading was anticipated twenty years ago by J. G. A. Pocock in his American
Historical Review article, “The Limits and Divisions of British History.” There he
argued that British history is an ostensibly local history that “extends itself into
Oceanic, American and global dimensions” on nothing less than a “planetary
35 Readings (n. 8 above), p. 30.
36 Paul Gilroy, The Black Atlantic: Modernity and Double Consciousness (Cambridge, Mass.,
1993), esp. chap. 3. Though Gilroy himself underplays it, that music is itself a hybrid of Caribbean
and South Asian forms (such as “the bangramuffin” of Bally Sagoo in the early 1990s).
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scale.”37 Pocock’s location as an expatriate New Zealander practicing a particular
brand of English history in the United States reminds us—among other things—
of the peculiar circuitry of imperial and ostensibly national histories, as well as
the politics of location where historical interpretation is concerned.38 Whether con-
sciously or not, Pocock himself echoed modernist discourses of the interwar period,
specifically those articulated by T. S. Eliot, who responded to Britain’s imperial
decline by advancing a robust English particularity that could reground Britain in
a kind of self-contained (if not originary) national culture.39 I would argue that the
reach for the global that the NACBS report articulates represents in many ways
what globalization in its weakest forms can mean in practice in many American
academic settings: that is, it can be a way to repackage existing national states and
forms without either interrogating their location in geopolitical structures of power
(what Mrinalini Sinha calls imperial social formation) or displacing the West as
the originary site of knowledge, power, resources, history.40 Clearly there are, and
have been, numerous scholars at work countering the reinscription of an essentially
British/European imperial worldview in narratives of the global—in monographs,
textbooks, and well-established periodicals like the Journal of World History.41 But
with its emphasis on state formation, world-systems theory, and economic empir-
icism, the race for the global in a time of economically straitened institutional
circumstances may also signal a much-coveted opportunity for those who feel
threatened by the “cultural turn” to wrest the historiographical high ground away
from representation toward a newly legitimated global “reality.”42
The political implications of this kind of repackaging, as well as its conse-
quences for commodity capital and the commercializing of virtually all domains
of thought, practice, knowledge, and history, is a question one hopes the NACBS
will continue to engage—especially given the appetite for British history that
Americans of all kinds still have. My experience of teaching British history in a
fairly wide variety of institutional settings (a former teacher’s college, a small
37 J. G. A. Pocock, “The Limits and Divisions of British History: In Search of the Unknown
Subject,” American Historical Review 87, no. 2 (1982): 319.
38 The seed essay of the American Historical Review piece was published as “British History:
A Plea for a New Subject,” New Zealand Journal of History 8 (1974): 3–21, and reprinted in the
Journal of Modern History 4 (1975): 601–24. It was also first given in the United States as the
address for the Modern European History section of the American Historical Association in 1978,
an itinerary of which I was unaware until recently.
39 Jed Esty, A Shrinking Island: Modernism and National Culture in England (Princeton, N.J.,
in press), provided courtesy of the author. See esp. pt. 3, “Insular Times: T. S. Eliot and Modern-
ism’s English End” and pt. 4, “Becoming Minor.”
40 Mrinalini Sinha, Colonial Masculinity: The “Manly Englishman” and the “Effeminate Ben-
gali” in the Late Nineteenth Century (Manchester, 1995).
41 See, most recently, Michael Adas, “From Settler Colony to Global Hegemon: Integrating the
Exceptionalist Narrative of the American Experience into World History,” American Historical
Review 106, no. 5 (2001): 1692–1720; and Robert Tignor et al., Worlds Together, Worlds Apart:
A History of the Modern World from the Mongol Empire to the Present (New York, 2002).
42 See Anthony Hopkins, “The History of Globalization—and the Globalization of History?”
in Globalization in World History, ed. Anthony Hopkins (London, 2002), pp. 11–46, and also his
“Back to the Future: From National History to Imperial History,” Past and Present, no. 164
(August 1999): 198–243.
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private university, a Big Ten setting) does not make me sanguine about the end of
Anglophilia; quite the opposite. I have found that undergraduates of many different
backgrounds and class positions come to British history classes hoping for the
same kinds of relief from the combative subjects of racial strife and struggle they
get in American history and literature courses that many white middle-class Amer-
icans seek when they turn on Masterpiece Theater. The difference is that college
students are more vociferous about their anger (and puzzlement) at the “corruption”
of British history as they expected to receive it: they vote with their feet, and on
course evaluations where they often pull no punches about the “excessive” atten-
tion to race and imperial subjects on my syllabi.
There may well be, in other words, more of an audience for an Anglophilic
version of British history than the pundits imagine, even perhaps among unantic-
ipated constituencies, since taste in history is correlated not directly or self-evi-
dently to skin color or class position but rather to the complex matrix in which
those signifiers create meaning and political consciousness. If indeed the face of
Anglophilia is changing, that transformation runs parallel to the ways in which
Britain, and British history, have not disappeared but are reappearing in “new,” yet
recognizable, cultural and political forms. As the reception in America of David
Cannadine’s recent book Ornamentalism suggests, even British imperial history is
being repackaged and circulated without race, or with an attenuated account of
it—thereby helping to guarantee that empire will remain user-friendly and un-
threatening to the American fetish of Britain as whiteness.43 The extent to which
this kind of account whitewashes the racial strife at the heart of twentieth-century
British history and naturalizes the vexed political contexts in which British history
has been written in the last three decades is simply astonishing. For Enoch Powell
(1912–98; Tory M.P. for three decades), writing as recently as 1985, the specter
of the empire taking revenge on the nation could be understood only in racialized
terms: “What sort of country will England be when its capital, other cities and
areas . . . consist of a population of which at least one-third is of African and Asian
descent? My answer . . . is that it will be a Britain unimaginably wrecked by
dissension and violent disorder, not recognizable as the same nation it had been,
or perhaps as a nation at all.”44 In this view, Britain itself is in danger of being no
longer recognizable as a nation because of the legacies of empire. Although it is
tempting to ask it, the question is not so much why Americans—whether consum-
ers of PBS or purveyors of British history—are so enamored of Powell’s fantasy
of Britain. Rather, it is how such whitewashed versions survive in an age of global
communications, when it should be as easy to see reports of race riots in Britain
as it is to see an ornamentalized British imperial history cross the sightline of an
elite transnational readership. In this sense, the acclaim that has greeted Canna-
dine’s book is in stark contrast to its real “Other”—not Said’s Orientalism but the
four-hundred-page Parekh Report, commissioned by the Runnymede Trust in
2000, which underscored the fact of multicultural life in contemporary Britain and
43 David Cannadine, Ornamentalism: How the British Saw Their Empire (Oxford, 2001).
44 Quoted in Clare E. Alexander, The Art of Being Black: The Creation of Black British Youth
Identities (Oxford, 1996), p. 5.
When Was Britain? 373
called for an end to “Englishness” as its signature national identity because of its
equation with whiteness and the inaccuracy of that designation for a decidedly
multiethnic population.45
Significantly, perhaps, I have found that many undergraduate students have less
trouble accepting the “incursions” of race into the national narrative than they do
those of gender and sexuality. This is more fruit for discussion, especially since in
the NACBS report the specter of empire appears to be much more threatening than
that of gender or women or even “ethnicity,” subjects the authors repeatedly ac-
knowledge as “quite properly” a part of the story of national history. The report
may have misread or overdetermined the cultural realities of the late twentieth-
century North American classroom, but its authors have their finger on the pulse
of the late twentieth-century university, which has come to recognize that it is no
longer the citadel of national culture and has attempted to respond with corporate
models of incorporation—primarily of “difference” and otherness but also, argu-
ably, of those particular identities and politics that challenge the universals at the
heart of globalization. In light of this shift, American universities have not just
embraced globalization as the greatest good but also have done so by simulta-
neously fetishizing and then absorbing the global: by incorporating “the world” as
a utopian—and, one must say, fantastical—version of the nation-state and its “cul-
tures.” Nowhere is this more evident than in American engagements with Britain
as history, the “when” that was Britain. In this sense, the much-critiqued “return”
of empire to British history is nothing compared with the eternal return of Britain
in America, where British history is destined to live on as the longed-for savior of
national history—and now, apparently, as the guarantor of transnational market-
ability as well.
There will be many for whom the events of September 11 signal a high-profile
return of Britain to the world stage, with the old imperial power advising the new
(though by no means unexperienced) American hegemon in what is perhaps the
most dangerous moment in world history yet. Even the transfer of imperial power
from one anglophone empire to another—which historians interested in such geo-
political truisms have long recognized as having occurred in the immediate post-
1945 era—appears to be newly visible in newly staged ways. In the same week
that Blair’s “foreign policy guru,” Robert Cooper, argued in the Observer that “we
still need empires,” Emily Eakin opined in the New York Times that “today, Amer-
ica is no mere superpower or hegemon but a full-blown empire in the Roman and
British sense.”46 The extent to which the news-watching American public knew
about the tremendous popular opposition to Blair’s support of the war against
Afghanistan and, later, Iraq, remains an open question, bound up in its own way
with the comparative invisibility in the U.S. media of racial disturbances in Britain
45 Lord Bhikhu Parekh et al., The Future of Multi-Ethnic Britain (London, 2000). For one
Labour government minister’s response, see Robin Cook, “Celebrating Britishness,” www.lco.
gov.uk/text_only/news/speechtext.
46 Robert Cooper, “Why We Still Need Empires,” Observer (April 7, 2002); Emily Eakin, “It
Takes an Empire,” New York Times (April 1, 2002). I am grateful to Tony Ballantyne for these
references.
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in the summer of 2001. But claims about the new world apparently inaugurated
by 9/11 should give us pause. It is worth noting here that Tony Blair’s appreciation
for the commodity value of a new script for the Anglo-American relationship was
evident well before that terrible day. His gift to George W. Bush of a statue of
Winston Churchill in the summer of 2001 is evidence of this, signaling as it does
not just the reproduction of images of another historical moment in the Anglo-
American relationship but also the desire for a new version of it—all of which
helps to facilitate the recirculation of the British past in the present and, very
possibly, in the future as well.
